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Abstract
This article attempts to transcend the “culture wars” as they are played out in the
family law arena by drawing on postmodern values, such as individualism and neutrality,
to allow individuals who so desire to choose to emphasize more traditional or
communitarian values, such as interdependence and attachment. This article argues,
then, as others have, that the role of contract in marriage should be extended for those
who choose to agree to additional terms. Here, the argument goes a step further,
however, by positing an active, positive role for communities of faith to play in a
marriage regime of expanded contract. Specifically, this article argues that communities
of faith should not only be allowed but, in fact, should be encouraged to define the types
of commitments they wish to bless as marriage.
This article first lays out some of the background for understanding changes in
marriage and divorce in America, including views on what marriage is and should be as
well as developments in society’s conceptions of morality and the role of law. It is in
this context that this paper presents some of the major legal and non-legal attempts that
have been made to strengthen marital commitments. After giving an overview of what
others have already written on how expanding the role of contract might be used in this
effort, this article builds on successful non-legal approaches used by communities of faith
by introducing the idea that such communitiesalso should participate in developing
marriage contracts. The rest of this article defends this proposition, both explaining why
communities of faith might desire to be involved in such a project as well as attempting
to answer critics, especially those concerned about furthering their particular vision for
the family in America – whether more progressive or traditional.
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The “culture wars” that have been raging since at least the 1960s show no signs of

cooling off. In fact, commentary on the red-state/blue-state dichotomy seems only to
have heated up since the 2004 presidential election. While the underlying issues related
to the “culture wars” are at play in many areas of the law, as seen in the politicization of
judicial confirmations, the most intense battleground may be the area of family law since
the heart of the ongoing fight is over competing visions of the family and intra-familial
relations. Many writers have enlisted with one side or another, and effectively staked out
a particular position and attempted to articulate a compelling vision for America. But
because each battle is seen as a zero-sum game, few have attempted to develop practical
solutions that bridge such divergent perspectives on the family. Since no side appears
anywhere close to “winning,” it is imperative that we develop family law solutions that
bridge some of the differences.
This paper attempts to build a bridge by proposing a greater pluralism in marriage
law to enable individuals to make choices that further their particular vision of the family,
without imposing that vision upon the whole of society. One set of culture-warriors
argues that the requirements for entering marriage should be heightened and that the
duties and rights in marriage should be increased to achieve greater stability in what they
consider the fundamental social institution. Another set of culture-warriors argues that
individuals should be allowed to easily enter and exit marriage and that society should be
especially concerned with the ongoing effects of patriarchal roles associated with such a
2

historically unjust social institution. This article takes an approach that cuts across the
divide by arguing, as others have,1 that the role of contract in marriage should be
extended for those who choose to agree to additional terms. In a sense, this approach
transcends the “culture wars” by drawing on postmodern values, such as individualism
and neutrality, to allow individuals who so desire to choose to emphasize more traditional
or communitarian values, such as interdependence and attachment. This article takes the
argument a step further, however, by positing an active, positive role for communities of
faith to play in a marriage regime of expanded contract. Specifically, I argue that
communities of faith should not only be allowed but, in fact, should be encouraged to
define the types of commitments they wish to bless as marriage.
This article first lays out some of the background for understanding changes in
marriage and divorce in America, including views on what marriage is and should be as
well as developments in society’s conceptions of morality and the role of law. After
laying out the shifts that have taken place in the last half-century or so, I present some of
the major legal and non-legal attempts that have been made to fix marriage. Then, I give
a brief overview what others have already written on how expanding the role of contract
might be used to strengthen marriage. Building on the fact that communities of faith
have already proven successful in some non-legal approaches to strengthening marital
commitments, I introduce the somewhat controversial idea that they also should be
1

See Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225 (1998);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev. 9 (1990);
Christopher Wolfe, The Marriage of Your Choice, 50 First Things 37 (1995); Ann Laquer, Embracing
Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 Md. L. Rev. 540 (2004); Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From
One-Size Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1479 (2001); Theodore F. Haas, The
Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 879 (1988); Ghada
G. Qaisi, Note, Religious Marriage Contracts: Judicial Enforcement of Mahr Agreements in American
Courts, 15 J.L. & Religion 67 (2000-01); but see Brian H. Bix, The Public and Private Ordering of
Marriage, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 295 (2004); James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 Ind. L.J.
875 (2000).

3

involved in strengthening marriage by participating in developing marriage contracts.
The rest of this paper defends this proposition, both explaining why communities of faith
might desire to be involved in such a project as well as attempting to answer critics. In
addressing likely criticism, I respond to several of the major anticipated concerns;
however, the reader should note at the outset that the defenses offered sacrifice depth
with regard to any particular anticipated critique in favor of breadth.
I.

Background
It is widely recognized that marriage as an institution is in decline in the United

States. Though divorce rates have leveled off to some extent in recent years, they have
remained at historically high levels.2 People are increasingly less likely to enter
marriage, and when they do their marriages have a high likelihood of ending in divorce.
The divorce rate, calculated as the number of divorces per year per 1,000 married women
age 15 or older, rose from 9.2 in 1960 to 22.6 in 1980, and then decreased slightly to 19.5
in 1996.3 Fully half of all marriages entered into today are likely to end in divorce.4 At
the same time as marriages have become increasingly likely to end, people have become
less and less likely to marry in the first place. The marriage rate, calculated as the
number of marriages per year per 1,000 unmarried women age 15 and older, has
continued to decline from a historical high of 90.2 in 1950 to 49.7 in 1996.5 This decline
in the marriage rate may account at least in part for the leveling of divorce rates in the
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U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1998, Table No. 156; U.S. Census Bureau,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1985, Table No. 120; U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1970, Table No. 75.
3
Id.
4
The National Marriage Project, The State of Our Unions 2002: The Social Health of Marriage in America
23 (2002).
5
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1998, Table No. 156; U.S. Census Bureau,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1985, Table No. 120; U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1970, Table No. 75.
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1980s and 1990s. At least part of the explanation for lower marriage rates is the
increasing prevalence of cohabiting unmarried adults. The number of couples cohabiting
has steadily increased, from approximately 440,000 in 19606 to 2.85 million in 1990 and
4.9 million in 2000.7 This represents a growth “[a]s a percentage of the total households
in the United States from .8% in 1960 to 2% in 1980 to 4.5% in 2000.” 8
While there is no doubt that a number of factors have contributed to the high
divorce rate, at least some of the blame rightly has been placed on the advent of the now
universal “no-fault” divorce regime. As its name implies, no-fault divorce allows either
party in a marriage to unilaterally terminate the marriage for any reason. While it seems
obvious that the ease of divorce in some sense encourages and de-stigmatizes divorce, for
the most part, the passage of no-fault divorce laws simply allowed the law to catch up
with society with regard to its changing attitudes toward marriage and divorce.9 While
the impact of these laws in facilitating and de-stigmatizing divorce should not be
understated, it is important to recognize that critics of no-fault divorce often have overemphasized the extent to which changes in divorce law itself wrought change.10
Some praise these developments insofar as they hail the demise of what they see
as an inherently exclusive and/or patriarchal institution that should have no place in a
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L.M. Casper et al. How does POSSLQ measure up? Historical estimates of cohabitation, Population
Division Working Paper No. 36 (1999), as cited in Sean E. Brotherson and William C. Duncan, Rebinding
the Ties that Bind: Gov’l Efforts to Preserve and Promote Marriage, 53 Family Relations 459, 460 (2004).
7
T. Simmons and G. O’Neill, Households and families: 2000, Census 2000 Brief (2001), as cited in
Brotherson and Duncan, supra n. 6, at 460.
8
J. Fields and L. Casper, America’s families and living arrangements, Census Bureau Current Population
Reports P20-537 (2000), as cited in Brotherson and Duncan, supra n. 6, at 460.
9
James Q. Wilson, The Marriage Problem, 162-166 (2002) (discussing the causes and consequences of nofault divorce).
10
See, e.g. Family Research Council, Deterring Divorce, at <http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=BC04D02>
(last visited April 9, 2005) (claiming, “Much of the rise in divorce rates can be attributed to no-fault
divorce laws . . . .”).
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progressive society. 11 The Scandinavian countries, and Sweden in particular, often are
held up as a model for actively seeking to end all forms of gender discrimination.12 In its
quest, Sweden has attempted to eliminate any legal or social pressures to marry and has
carved out an active role for the State in extinguishing any economic consequences of
divorce,13 through, for example, state allowances.14 The fruit of such policies is seen in
the fact that it is now as common for children to be born out of wedlock as it is for
children to be born to married parents in Sweden.15 Finally, there is little, if any, social
pressure in Sweden for a couple with children to marry or to stay married, should they in
fact marry.16
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The following examples were compiled in James Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 Hofstra L.
Rev. 931 (2003) of authors who have criticized the institution of marriage: See Martha Albertson Fineman,
The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 228-29 (1995) (calling
for the elimination of special rules governing marriage and divorce, and for regulating relationships
between adult sexual partners according to the ordinary rules of civil and criminal law); Judith Stacey,
Brave New Families: Stories of Domestic Upheaval in Late Twentieth Century America 269 (1990)
(arguing in favor of eliminating marriage as an "ideological concept that imposes mythical homogeneity on
the diverse means by which people organize their intimate relationships"); Gayle White, Weighing the Pros
& Cons of Marriage: Con: Shift Focus to Caretakers, Dependents, Atlanta J. Const., Mar. 29, 2003, at B1;
see also Summer L. Nastich, Questioning the Marriage Assumptions: The Justifications for “Opposite-Sex
Only” Marriage as Support for the Abolition of Marriage, 21 Law & Ineq. 114, 115-116 (2003) (arguing
that "while limiting legal marriage to opposite-sex couples is completely unjustifiable, marriage itself is
unjustifiable--whether opposite-sex, same-sex, or both" and that "elimination of the legal institution of
marriage would accomplish the social goals and objectives of marriage more successfully than marriage
currently does"); Emily Taylor, Note, Across the Board: The Dismantling of Marriage in Favor of
Universal Civil Union Laws, 28 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 171, 174 (2001) (advocating the dismantling of all
current marriage laws and their replacement by "civil union laws to be used by all couples who seek the
state derived benefits of their partnership").
12
See Allan C. Carlson, Family Questions: Reflections on the American Social Crisis 20-25 (1991)
(recounting a brief history of the move to eliminate gender discrimination and gender-role differentiation in
Sweden).
13
See Id. at 118 (discussing changes in Swedish tax law that removed incentives for marriage).
14
See Carlson, supra n. 12, at 69, 118 (noting increasing Swedish government child allowances and
marriage-neutral tax policy).
15
See, e.g. Id. at 70-71 (noting that by 1986 nearly 50% of all children born in Sweden were illegitimate);
Noelle Cox, Nordic family ties don’t mean tying the knot, USA Today (December 15, 2004) at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-12-15-marriage_x.htm (last visited May 2, 2005) (noting that
half of all children in Scandinavia are born to unmarried mothers).
16
See, e.g. Cox, supra n.14 (discussing the lack of social stigma attached to out-of-wedlock births in
Scandinavia).
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Despite the trends toward cohabitation and divorce, which might suggest
otherwise, polling data indicate that the vast majority of Americans still regard the
institution of marriage as very important to them personally.17 Consistent majorities view
the high divorce rate as a “Very Serious Problem.”18 In one survey, 62% of respondents
said that divorce in this country should be harder to obtain than it is now.19 Another
survey found that 61% of respondents believed it should be harder for married couples
with children to get a divorce.20 Surveys shows people support measures that would
make it more difficult for couples to divorce. For example, 78% of respondents to one
poll agreed with a specific proposal that would require all married couples with children
go to counseling before a divorce is granted.21
Similarly, a high percentage of Americans sees marriage as especially significant
for the raising of children. These opinions hold despite the fact that a majority of people
no longer finds cohabitation by unmarried partners morally troubling.22 In fact, among
high school seniors, most “Agree” or “Mostly Agree” with the statement: “It is usually a
good idea for a couple to live together before getting married in order to find out whether
they really get along.”23
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In one poll, 92% of respondents said having a successful marriage was “Very Important” to them.
Wirthlin Worldwide, August 1996, as cited in The Family, Marriage: Highly Valued, 17 Public Perspective
(1998). In another poll, 81% of respondents said having a good marriage was “Absolutely Necessary” to
consider his or her life a success. Research, Strategy, Management & Belden Russonello & Stewart for
American Assoc. of Retired Persons, Money and the American Family Survey (Jan. 23 - Feb. 21, 2000).
18
Hart and Teeter Research for NBC News, Wall Street Journal, June 16-19, 1999.
19
Chilton Research for The Washington Post, Harvard University, and the Kaiser Family Foundation, July
29 – Aug. 18, 1998.
20
Time, CNN poll, May 7 -8, 1997, as cited in Walter Kirn, The Ties That Bind: Should Breaking Up Be
Harder to Do? The Debate Over Easy Divorce Rages On, Time, Aug. 18, 1997, p. 49.
21
Wirthlin Worldwide poll, July 7-10, 2000.
22
Gallup Organization for CNN, USA Today, May 18-20, 2001.
23
Jerald G. Bachman et al., Monitoring the Future: Questionnaire Responses from the Nation’s High
School Seniors, The Monitoring of the Future Study, Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research
(2000).
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At the same time, a significant majority of people believes it is best for children to
grow up in two-parent families.24 Not only do Americans think it best that children are
raised by two parents, but surveys also show that a strong majority of Americans believes
that it is better for children to be raised in a household with a married mother and
father.25 These results are especially significant given that Americans are divided as to
the morality of unmarried cohabitation. A significant proportion of those who do not find
unmarried cohabitation morally troubling believe it is nonetheless not the ideal family
situation for the raising of children. This shows disapproval of the high divorce rate and
cohabiting couples raising children outside of marriage does not appear to be limited to
the small segment of the population labeled the “religious right.”
In fact, voices on the political left raised concerns about the implications of rising
divorce rates as early as the 1960s. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan issued his
provocative report in 1965, “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action.”26 In that
report, he outlined how poverty among African-Americans was linked, at least in part, to
a breakdown in family structure.27 While his report was widely criticized as “blaming the
victim” when it was originally published, 28 his analysis emphasizing the significance of

24

When asked, “Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement of family and child
rearing: It is generally best for children to grow up in two-parent homes. Agree strongly, agree somewhat ,
disagree somewhat, disagree strongly?”, 72% of respondents said they “Agree Strongly” and another 15%
said they “Agree Somewhat.” Public Agenda, Necessary Compromises Survey, June 1-15, 2000.
25
A 1996 Los Angeles Times Poll found 71% of respondents agreed, “It’s always best for children to be
raised in a home where a married man and woman are living together as father and mother…” Los Angeles
Times poll, April 13-16, 1996, as cited in Families: A Strong Yes to the ‘Traditional’ Structure, Public
Perspective 20 (Feb/Mar 1998).
26
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Moynihan Report: The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, March
1965, United States Department of Labor Office of Planning and Research, available at
<http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/history/webid-meynihan.htm> (last visited April 8, 2005).
27
Id.
28
William Ryan, Blaming the Victim 64 (2d ed. 1976).
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family breakdown has come to be respected over time by those on the right as well as the
left as his predictions have come to pass.29
A. Changing Conceptions of Morality and the Proper Role of Law
Understanding how to deal with rising divorce rates and increasing cohabitation
among adults raising children cannot be dealt with adequately, however, without first
acknowledging broader recent developments in society, law, and society’s view of the
role of the law. In relation to marriage, divorce, and cohabitation, two trends are
especially significant: (1) the rise of postmodern morality, and (2) the shift in family law
toward focusing on individuals rather than groups. Both of these trends have been widely
studied and generally are accepted as accurate descriptions of what has taken place in the
United States over the last half-century or so. Accordingly, this paper merely outlines
these developments and then focuses on the implications of these developments for the
topic at hand.
The liberalization in moral attitudes regarding family and sexuality has come to
be recognized as the “sexual revolution.” The changes wrought in society through this
revolution are profound in terms of the changes in both attitudes and actions. For
example, in the short four-year period between 1969 and 1973, the percentage of
American who said they believe “it is wrong for people to have sex relations before
marriage” decreased from 68% to 48%.30 The dramatic changes wrought in sexual

29

By the 1980s, Moynihan’s central argument came to be accepted by mainstream media. In 1986, it was
the focus of a television documentary by Bill Moyers, The Vanishing Black Family—Crisis in Black
America. See Bryce Christenson, Time for a New ‘Moynihan Report’? Confronting the National Family
Crisis, The Family in America, vol. 18, no. 10 (Oct. 2004), available at
<http://www.profam.org/pub/fia/fia_1810.htm#fn4> (last visited April 8, 2005). See also Robert Rector,
Welfare Reform and the Healthy Marriage Initiative, available at
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/tst021005a.cfm> (last visited April 8, 2005).
30
E. Shorter, The Making of the Modern Family 114 (1975), as cited in Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse
and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1843-1844 (1985).
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behavior are illustrated vividly by a 1992 survey showing the percentages of women in
various age groups who said they had not had premarital sex: 30.2% of women 18-29,
27.4% of women 30-39, 33.8% of women 40-49, and 55.1% of women 50-59.31 These
survey results illustrate the sharp change in sexual behavior between women 50-59 and
women 40-49, those who came of age in the 1970s.
Not surprisingly, despite increased availability and use of birth control as well as
abortion, this increased sexual behavior outside of marriage led to rapid increases in
conceiving and bearing children outside of marriage. During the years 1960-64, 74% of
first births among women age 15-29 were conceived after marriage, compared to 47%
during 1990-94.32 The changes are further seen in the rise in the percentage of births to
unwed mothers, which rose only a relatively small amount from 3.8% in 1940 to 5.3% in
1960, but continued to rise steadily thereafter through the late 1990s when births to
unwed mothers constituted about one-third of all births.33 Furthermore, changing morés
regarding sexual behavior made it more socially acceptable for these women to bear and
raise their children out of wedlock.
This waning of traditional moral values, particularly those related to the JudeoChristian tradition, has led directly to the law dropping statements of moral aspiration.34
In the family law context, it has been shown that the law largely “has deserted its
function of prescribing and describing norms of conduct whose purpose is to maintain

31

Edward O. Laumann et al., The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States
214 (1994).
32
Amara Bachu, Trends in Premarital Childbearing 1930 to 1994, Current Population Reports, P20-543,
U.S. Census Bureau, Table 2 (2001).
33
Stephanie Venture et al., Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1940-99, National Vital Statistics
Reports 48, Table 1 (2000); Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2000, Table D.
34
Schneider, supra n. 30, at 1845.
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families as places for interdependent, collective living and the nurture of children.”35 It is
not that that law has traded in its moral ideals for another set of moral ideals about what
should govern family life; instead, the law has “‘relinquish[ed] most of its overt attempts
to promote any particular set of ideas about family life,’ reflecting instead modern legal
values of pragmatism, antiformalism, and neutrality.”36
As people have come to accept alternative lifestyles as legitimate and undeserving
of moral condemnation, they have become less likely to believe that the law should
enforce or even encourage particular lifestyles. There are, of course, counterexamples to
this trend away from moral discourse in the law, as with the abortion issue. On this
particular issue, Americans continue to be divided with both sides making strident moral
appeals. By providing such a stark contrast to other legal debates, however,
counterexamples such as the abortion issue only highlight the extent to which moral
discourse has been eliminated from the law.
As postmodern morality has taken a hold, family law has moved away from its
traditional emphasis on group values such as interdependence and attachment, in favor of
individual values such as equality and individuality.37 In her widely-cited comparative
work The Transformation of Family Law, Mary Ann Glendon detailed how this shift has
taken place in the United States and Western Europe. As Glendon wrote, family and the
institution of marriage once were but now no longer are “the essential determinants of an

35

Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 245, 247 (1990)
(reviewing Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law and Family in the United
States and Western Europe (1989)).
36
Woodhouse, supra n. 35, at 264, citing Glendon, supra n. 35, at 297.
37
Woodhouse, supra n. 35, at 246.
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individual’s economic security and social standing.”38 As a result, the law now protects
the family because it serves individual fulfillment rather than because it serves society.39
Furthermore, despite the fact that postmodern (a)morality has resulted in family
law no longer explicitly promoting a particular ideal family life, the postmodern veil of
neutrality “masks a bias favoring the values of equality, individual freedom, and
tolerance.”40 As many scholars have recognized, emphasizing individual rights in family
law may in some sense set the individual free, but at the same time this emphasis “invites
us to value individual interest above family and societal stability.”41 A consequence of
this individual-centeredness may be that “[t]his ordering paradoxically works to the
detriment of individuals as well as families, for individuals are born into and must suffer
the fates of families.”42
Debates on family law present a false dichotomy when they are reduced to the
question of whether the law should set a standard to be lived up to or should simply
reflect the reality of people’s lives.43 This approach ignores that a family law regime that
does not present a norm toward which people should strive, in fact embodies a value
system that says there is no norm. Solutions to problems in family law must therefore
recognize that the American family law system will no longer propagate explicit norms
for family life, yet at the same time the system implicitly favors the values of “equality,
38

Glendon, supra n. 35, at 292, as cited in Woodhouse, supra n. 35, at 263.
Glendon, supra n. 35, at 292-293, as cited in Woodhouse, supra n. 35, at 263.
40
Woodhouse, supra n. 35, at 264.
41
Id. at 255, citing Martha Minow, Forming Underneath Everything that Grows: Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819, 893-894; David L. Chambers, The “Legalization” of the Family:
Toward a Policy of Supportive Neutrality, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 805 (1985); Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce
Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 1015 (1985); Frances E. Olsen, The
Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 835 (1985); Michael S. Wald, Introduction
to the Family, the State and the Law, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 799 (1985).
42
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 245, 255 (1990)..
43
See, e.g. Ezra Hasson, Setting a Standard or Reflecting Reality? The ‘Role’ of Divorce Law, and the
Case of the Family Law Act 1996, 17 Int’l J.L. & Pol’y & Fam. 338 (2003).
39
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individual freedom, and tolerance.”44 As a result, innovative solutions must discover
ways to emphasize these favored values by empowering individuals to choose to
emphasize more traditional or communitarian values such as interdependence and
attachment, which in turn can strengthen family and societal stability.
B. Attempts to Fix Marriage
Wide-ranging concerns about the high divorce rate and declining marriage rates
have led to a multitude of proposals for strengthening the institution of marriage.
Proposals involving legal means have focused on placing burdens on either the decision
to marry or the decision to divorce. Attempts to produce wiser decisions upon entering
marriage have included waiting periods and premarital counseling.45 Attempts to cause
more careful reflection upon divorce similarly have included waiting periods, counseling,
and mediation.46 Other proposals have gone so far as to call for a to return to a faultbased divorce regime.47
Beyond the legal means that have been proposed, there is a growing network of
individuals and organizations that emphasize non-legal means for strengthening
commitments in marriage. Some of these efforts to strengthen marriage, such as
Marriage Encounter, which was imported to the United States by Catholics in Spain,

44

Woodhouse, supra n. 42, at 264.
For example, Florida and Utah have passed legislation to fund premarital preparation. Similarly, the
federal government provided for TANF grants to states for marriage education efforts. See Sean E.
Brotherson and William C. Duncan, Rebinding the Ties that Bind: Gov’l Efforts to Preserve and Promote
Marriage, 53 Family Relations 459, 461-62 (2004).
46
For example, the Michigan Mediation Project refers couples considering divorce to mediation before
they enter legal proceedings. See Id.
47
See Id. at 465 (“In recent legislative sessions in various states, other types of bills have been introduced
to deal with the issues related to divorce. These included prohibitions on no-fault divorce actions when the
divorce was contested by one of the parties or included children (Georgia, Massachusetts, Montana), a
requirement of marriage counseling or marriage education before a divorce is granted (Arizona), and
allowance for a court to refer a divorcing couple for counseling or mediation (Washington).”)
45
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began as early as the 1970s.48 What has been called the “marriage movement”, however,
began in earnest in the mid-1990s with groups such as Marriage Savers and Smart
Marriages.49 Such efforts do not see social problems such as divorce and children being
raised out of wedlock as matters to be solved by the State coercing people to stay or get
married. Instead these non-legal approaches tend to see social problems of this nature as
matters to be dealt with by individuals, through greater personal commitments, and by
social institutions, such as churches, through raising social expectations.
1. Legal Efforts to Strengthen Marriage
In an innovative legal effort to strengthen marriage, three states have adopted, and
several more have considered, some form of what is called “Covenant Marriage.”50
Under this new marriage regime, when a couple marries they select whether to opt into
standard or covenant marriage. Under standard marriage, there are no additional entrance
requirements. Covenant marriage, in contrast, imposes additional entrance requirements,
including the requirement that the couple go through some form of pre-marital counseling
and that they have explained to them the additional exit requirements imposed on those
opting for covenant marriage.51
It remains too early to thoroughly assess the impact of covenant marriage laws;
however, early findings “show that covenant marriage was associated with lower marital
disruption in the first 5 years of marriage and lower perceived chance of separation

48

William J. Doherty and Jared R. Anderson, Community Marriage Initiatives, 53 Family Relations 425
(2004).
49
Id. at 425-426.
50
For the text of the legislation passed in Louisiana, See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:272-275.1, 307-309
(West 2004). For detailed analysis, See Katherine S. Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social
Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 La. L. Rev. 63 (1998).
51
The Louisiana statute, for example, requires some form of premarital counseling and an explanation of
the additional requirement of Covenant Marriage. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:272 (West 2004).
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among wives.”52 As time passes and further data become available, it will be necessary
to assess the extent of selection effects, particularly since it is known that couples
selecting covenant marriage are more “religiously active, serious about premarital
preparation, and committed to the marital ideal.”53
Each of the states that has enacted a covenant marriage statute also makes it more
difficult to exit a covenant marriage than a standard marriage. While the states vary in
terms of the acceptable grounds for divorce, each requires that divorce only be granted in
cases where some enumerated fault-based ground is established or the divorcing spouse
complies with a waiting requirement that allows divorce only after the couple is separated
for some specified period of time, 54 presumably to prevent hasty divorces.
2. Non-legal Efforts to Strengthen Marriage
Efforts to strengthen marriage have also included a variety of non-legal means.
For example, groups have sprung up to encourage wise decisions upon entering marriage,
to equip couples to more effectively deal with conflict, and to divert couples whose
marriages might be salvaged to counseling and/or mediation before proceeding to
divorce.55 Of the most noteworthy and possibly effective non-legal means that have been
used recently to combat divorce are “Community Marriage Policies.”56
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While they vary depending on the locality in which a policy is adopted, the basic
idea in Community Marriage Policies is for stakeholders in a community, led by church
leaders, to meet to design and commit to a plan intended to strengthen marriage.57
Community Marriage Policies often involve clergy committing to not marry couples
unless the couples first undergo premarital counseling or take part in what is called a
“premarital inventory” for couples.58 Community Marriage Policies were first
implemented in 1986 when Mike and Harriet McManus worked with leaders in the city
of Modesto, California.59 The couple began traveling around the country promoting the
implementation of similar policies.60 In 1996, they formed the organization Marriage
Savers, which holds itself out as “a ministry that equips local communities, principally
through local congregations, to help men and women to: prepare for life-long marriages,
strengthen existing marriages, and restore troubled marriages.”61
Marriage Savers has developed an intense program relying on grass-roots activity
to mentor couples just starting out as well as those who are married and experiencing
problems. Marriage Savers sees developing mentor couples who will work with engaged
and newlywed couples as one of its principal goals.62 Local pastors select couples
considered to have a vital, long-term marriage to participate in twelve hours of training
over two days.63 This training prepares the mentor couples to administer and discuss a
premarital inventory and to lead mentored couples through exercises related to
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communication and conflict resolution.64 For troubled marriages, mentor couples are
trained to lead mentored couples through seventeen “marriage ministry action steps”
similar to twelve-step programs geared toward ending addiction.65
Marriage Savers claims that Community Marriage Policies have reduced divorce
rates substantially where they have been implemented.66 For example, the group claims
that as a result of the Community Marriage Policy implemented in Modesto, California in
1986, the divorce rate declined by 47.6% by 2001, even while the marriage rate increased
by 12.3% as of 1999 (based on the last available data).67 To combat the skepticism with
which the group’s claims of dramatic results were greeted, Marriage Savers
commissioned a study by the independent Institute for Research and Evaluation to assess
the extent of the effect, if any, of implementing a Community Marriage Policy on a
community’s divorce rate.68 The study is significant in that it found there is a statistically
significant impact on divorce rates where a Community Marriage Policy has been
implemented.69 While the declines in divorce rate attributed to the Community Marriage
Policies were relatively small, the results of the study are important in that they show a
grass-roots effort can actually make a statistically significant impact on divorce rates.70
The study matched counties with similar underlying trends in divorce rates to evaluate
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the differences attributable to the Community Marriage Policies themselves.71 The study
estimated reduction in divorce rate of 2% more per year in counties that implemented
Community Marriage Policies.72 Accordingly, counties with a Community Marriage
Policy had an 8.6% decline in the divorce rate over four years, while comparison counties
had a 5.6% decline.73
These results are impressive, particularly given that nothing in the Marriage
Savers approach to Community Marriage Policies is legally binding on any of those
involved. While pastors agree to uphold the requirements of the Community Marriage
Policy adopted, nothing legally binds them to uphold their commitments. That pastors
held to their commitments is not especially surprising, however, since their social
position suggests they would suffer a high social cost for reneging on their commitments.
Still, we might expect a subset of pastors, those unlikely to suffer such social costs, to not
make such commitments in the first place or to renege on their commitments, thereby
reducing the impact of Community Marriage Policies by wooing couples seeking
wedding facilities and less onerous premarital requirements. Finally, the results are also
surprising because nothing about the conflict resolution procedures or any other aspect of
the program is binding (legally or otherwise) on the couples once married and the couples
themselves are not subject to the same social costs as pastors.
C. Using Contract to Strengthen Marriage
Some commentators and academics have advocated avoiding direct state action
by simply allowing individuals to structure the terms of their marriages; similar to the
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way we allow businesses to structure their financial relationships.74 The call for
customized contractual marriage has expanded beyond the scholarly realm and was
recently discussed in the left-leaning San Francisco Chronicle,75 and thereafter in a small
wave of blogs.76 In the commercial context we see contracts as indispensable means for
securing commitments. Parties agree in advance to the terms for their relationship and
often set out the consequences, if any, should either of the parties fail to live up to the
agreement. Though parties to a contract give up some of their autonomy in binding
themselves to some commitment, the parties agree to the contract precisely because they
believe that despite giving up some autonomy they are in fact furthering their own selfinterest.
While commercial relationships differ from intimate relationships, there is reason
to believe a similar logic applies. Elizabeth Scott has outlined how it can be rational for
individuals to use precommitment strategies when they seek to pursue long-term goals
but fear making future choices based on inconsistent short-term preferences.77 Her
analysis fits well in the marriage context, where individuals may have the long-term goal
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of a lifelong marriage, yet absent additional precommitment, short-term difficulties in the
relationship or other fleeting preferences might undermine the long-term goal. Elizabeth
and Robert Scott use this analysis as a basis for conceiving of marriage as a relational
contract.78
Critics who argue against the idea of extending contract principles to marriage
include scholars from a range of legal, political, and sociological perspectives. These
critics include communitarians who express concern that contract produces a limited
conception of marriage as a relationship based merely on individual fulfillment, thus
harming the interests of women and children while undermining societal welfare and
stability.79 At the same time, some critics simply say contract principles are
inappropriate for intimate relationships because individuals are less likely to be motivated
by their own self-interest since such relationships are characterized by altruism and
coercion. 80 Feminists have argued this approach constitutes a thinly veiled effort to
reinvigorate traditional gender roles.81 Social conservatives fear extending contract in
marriage will undermine the state role in marriage altogether, ushering in complete
private ordering in intimate relationships, thus paving the way for developments such as
gay marriage and polygamy.82 Others have appealed to a conception of human nature as
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constantly changing to criticize a marriage regime in which “earlier selves” could
unfairly bind “later selves.”83
Allowing individuals to bind themselves to one another in more enduring ways
would further the postmodern values of neutrality, individualism, equality, and tolerance,
respecting individuals enough to allow them to set the terms of their relationships, rather
than leaving such important matters in the hands of the paternalistic state. At the same
time, furthering individualism through a more contractual marriage regime actually
would give those individuals the tools to strengthen family and societal stability by
allowing them the freedom to more explicitly make choices that value interdependence
and attachment. Using contract to strengthen marriage rather than other legal means,
such as a return to a fault-based system, would avoid conscripting a coercive state into
requiring stronger terms for all marriages. Thus, using contract would allow the state to
maintain a more neutral stance toward marriage terms because a contract-style legal
regime would not require the state to advocate any particular normative vision of
marriage or the family. This proposed marital regime is, therefore, consistent with
widely accepted postmodern values.
Measures such as Covenant Marriage are similar to advancing contract in the
marriage context in that both approaches allow couples to decide whether to opt into a
more stringent legal regime. Advancing contract, as opposed to Covenant Marriage,
however, provides additional advantages. Under Covenant Marriage, couples may
choose one of only two possible legal regimes to which their marriage will be subject,
and the state maintains a relatively significant role in that it continues to set allthe terms
of both of the two legal regimes. In contrast, advancing contract in marriage further
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reduces the role of the state to only (1) setting the minimum requirements for entering
marriage, (2) setting the minimum responsibilities spouses must assume toward one
another, and (3) enforcing any additional terms agreed to by couples. This is significant
because Covenant Marriage has drawn criticism from those who argue that it advances a
particular normative vision of the family by adopting a form of fault-based divorce.
Advancing contract is not likely to draw the same political fire because it avoids enlisting
state support for a particular normative vision. Instead, advancing contract principles
amounts only to legal enforcement of the terms a couple agrees to apart from any state
influence or endorsement. This approach avoids controversy because it is neutral on its
face and directly advances postmodern values, including individualism, pluralism, and
diversity. Under this approach, couples could design terms to further different types of
relationship goals, whether they desire something more akin to traditional marriage with
distinct gender roles or something more egalitarian in nature that works to eliminate
gender stereotypes.84
II.

Involving Communities of Faith in Extending Contract in Marriage
As others have advocated, I argue that the use of contract in marriage should be

expanded and legally enforced. In particular, while the state should continue to set the
minimum requirements for entering marriage, as well as the minimum responsibilities
spouses must assume toward one another, individuals should be allowed to strengthen
their marriages through additional terms. Individuals might rationally agree to the
following kinds of terms: (1) restrictions on the available grounds for divorce, (2)
additional burdens placed on a party seeking divorce, (3) arbitration or mediation in the
84
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event either or both spouses seek a divorce, or (4) how custody and visitation should be
determined for any children born or adopted during the marriage. In most circumstances,
enforcing such provisions would further postmodern values such as individualism and
pluralism while providing the opportunity for individuals to choose to emphasize
traditional or communitarian values such as interdependence and attachment.
This paper takes this line of argument a step further by positing an active positive
role for communities of faith to play in a marriage regime of expanded contract. We
should not only allow but also encourage communities of faith to define what types of
commitments they will bless as marriage. Congregations that have adopted Community
Marriage Policies have already imposed restrictions on the civil marriages they bless.
These efforts should be expanded to allow communities of faith not only to require
couples they marry to take certain actions before they are married (such as premarital
counseling) but also to require certain legally enforceable premarital commitments (such
as restrictions and burdens on the availability of divorce, as discussed in this paper). This
calls for a shift in the current understanding of the role of communities of faith in
performing weddings. Currently, communities of faith may only limit who they will
marry based on what the couples say or do prior to marriage. Under the proposed
marriage regime, communities of faith would have an increased role as marital
gatekeepers since the requirements they impose on couples before marriage potentially
could exercise legally enforceable sway through the life of the marriage.
This proposed marriage regime could result in a number of possibilities. At one
extreme, this proposal could lead to marriages with a wide variety of marriage terms,
varying depending on the particular community of faith involved with each wedding.
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There might be significant differences as to the required terms for marriage both on an
interfaith as well as an intra-faith basis. It is not even clear whether interfaith differences
would be as significant as intra-faith differences. For example, the differences between
the various branches of Judaism could be more significant than those between Islam and
Christianity. If the proposed marriage regime produced such variety, there would be a
marriage term “market” with a great degree of competition among congregations or faiths
for would-be married couples. Such a result likely would assuage concerns some might
raise about potential opportunities for coercion by communities of faith, because
communities of faith would have to compete in this market.
At the other extreme, the proposed marriage regime could lead communities of
faith to band together, as those in some cities have already worked together to adopt
Community Marriage Policies. Banding together would allow communities of faith to
raise the level of commitment required for entering religious marriage of any kind. For
such cooperation to work, the level of commitment could only be raised to the level of
the least stringent obligations to which all of the cooperating communities of faith could
agree. If the proposed marriage regime produced this kind of cooperation among
communities of faith, there might be more reason to be concerned about coercion. Even
if such cooperative action ensued, however, the proposed regime would continue to allow
civil ceremonies administered by public officials for couple who need meet only the
minimum state entry requirements and the minimum level of commitment required by the
state. Furthermore, because cooperative action by communities of faith will result only
in the least stringent level of obligations agreed to by all cooperating communities, the
additional commitment required in the event of cooperation is not likely to be very great.
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Given that people would retain the option of civil marriage with no additional
requirements, this proposed marriage regime should not be seen as coercive.
Thus, there would be no significant coercion regardless of whether the proposal
were to result in great diversity among contract terms varyingbycommunity , cooperation
among communities of faith to require more stringent terms for any religious marriage, or
something in between these extremes. Instead, steps toward this kind of marriage regime
should be seen as affording individuals both (1) greater contractual freedom in their
ability to set the terms for marriage, and (2) increased associational freedom by allowing
individuals to associate with a community of faith that defines marriage as the individual
sees fit and can act to uphold that definition.
Similarly, the proposed marriage regime would expand associational freedom for
groups. Allowing groups to define the terms of their members’ marriages would expand
their ability to define themselves. This marriage regime would allow groups to define
and uphold a more rigorous understanding of marriage relationships, rather than forcing
groups to accept the currently universal and less demanding form of marriage.
Furthermore, respecting this form of group associational freedom advances the
postmodern values of pluralism and diversity by allowing variety and group expression of
identity.
The basic proposal of this paper is thus two-fold. First, the enforcement of
contractual provisions in marriage should be expanded. Just as in the commercial
context, individuals could further their long-term self-interest by choosing to
contractually limit some aspects of their freedom.85 Second, communities of faith should
be encouraged to expand their role in calling for greater commitment from the couples for
85
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whom they perform marriage ceremonies through particular contractual provisions,
similar to the way they already have instituted Community Marriage Policies.
Communities of faith would then be able to require that those couples they marry agree to
specific contractual provisions that further bind them to one another through legally
enforceable means.
Many proposals have been offered for particular marriage terms under a marriage
regime involving greater private ordering, including calls for the enforcement of
arbitration agreements and terms dealing with how to award child custody and visitation
in the event of divorce. This paper focuses on contractual restrictions and burdens placed
on the availability of divorce. This focus is warranted because such contractual
innovations may be the most significant innovations under a more contractual approach
to marriage for stemming the tide of divorce. This is especially salient as much social
science research has shown divorce causes greater repercussions in couples’ lives and
especially the lives of their children than was previously known.86 In addition, such
terms may be the sort that people with very different normative goals might be able to
embrace. Contractual restrictions and burdens on the availability of divorce may serve as
an example solution for other seemingly intractable problems in family law by using
broadly shared postmodern values to empower individuals who so choose to emphasize
more traditional or communitarian values in their own lives. In particular, I argue that
couples should be allowed to restrict the grounds under which they will be allowed to
seek divorce and they should be allowed to adopt legally binding consequences in their
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premarital agreements for a spouse who seeks divorce. For example, couples should be
able to opt to return to a fault-based regime should they wish.
There are a number of objections that might be raised against this proposed
marriage regime from a variety of perspectives. This paper addresses philosophical,
results-minded, constitutional, public policy, and contractual concerns. Furthermore, I
argue that there is no reason to believe that advancing contract in marriage necessarily
undermines the state’s ability to set the floor for the institution of marriage. Just as
contract and constitutional law provide the ceiling for the enforceability of marriage
terms, public policy provides the floor for the minimum requirements. Nothing about
this proposal undoes the state’s ongoing interest in promoting marital stability. This
proposal simply would allow for private ordering along a greater range of marriage terms,
the outer bounds of which would be set by public policy on the one hand and contract and
constitutional law on the other. Therefore, it seems that this proposal could only improve
the state of marriage in America.
III.

Limiting Divorce through Restricted Grounds and Added Consequences
This section focuses on how couples might use contract to strengthen their

marriages by either restricting the grounds available to them for divorce and/or agreeing
in advance to particular consequences for a spouse if he or she seeks divorce. This
section begins by explaining, using pre-commitment theory, how it could be rational for
individuals to opt into this kind of more restrictive marriage regime. Furthermore, this
paper contributes to pre-commitment theory in the marriage context by explaining why
communities of faith might decide to only marry couples that agree to additional terms
which comport with the particular community’s definition of marriage.
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After detailing the theory and the proposal, I respond to the arguments of critics
who say such a regime is deficient on theoretical as well as policy grounds and is subject
to challenges under constitutional and contract law doctrines. I emphasize how this
proposal’s added dimension of involvement by communities of faith does not increase the
viability of these concerns that are likely to be raised. This section illustrates my general
proposition that increased contractual freedom in marriage can further postmodern as
well as traditional or communitarian values: allowing individuals to choose restrictive
terms in a marriage contract furthers the postmodern values of individualism and
pluralism while allowing individuals who so choose to increase their commitment to
traditional or communitarian values such as interdependence and attachment.
A. Pre-Commitment as Rational for Individuals and Communities of Faith
The most extreme version of this kind of proposal would allow individuals to
“choose freely to enter into an indissoluble marriage.”87 In arguing for this proposal,
somewhat tongue in cheek, one of Christopher Wolfe’s goals is to show that the current
marriage regime, in fact, forces people to be free.88 He argues that the current marriage
regime is a version of “liberal paternalism” in that it says, “Those who would seriously
commit themselves to an indissoluble marriage—indissoluble in a binding and legally
enforceable way, not just as a personal ideal or goal—are making a mistake. They must
be protected from the consequences of their own improvidence.”89 Wolfe contrasts this
perspective with that of traditional communities, such as Roman Catholics, who though
they “deny the absolute value of the autonomous life” they are “not permitted to make
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legally enforceable contracts binding themselves to abide by what they take to be the
moral law.”90
The decision to restrict the available grounds for divorce or to choose penalties
should a spouse seek a divorce could be based either on communitarian virtue or
enlightened self-interest.91 The communitarian approach might say either “the
community authoritatively commands a restrictive divorce regime” or even if it does not
that “the community is better off if the individuals in it bind themselves to a restrictive
marital regime.”92 The communitarian approach conceives of the law less in terms of
rights and more in terms of duties, and intends for the law to promote the good of the
community.93 While this approach provides a rational explanation as to why one might
opt for a restrictive marital regime, this paper emphasizes approaches that appeal to
enlightened self-interest to illustrate the broader argument that allowing individuals
greater contractual freedom, even if they use that freedom to restrict their options, is
consistent with postmodern values, particularly individualism.
Marriage in the United States has been imbued with the value of individualistic
utilitarianism; that is, individuals now largely see themselves as having a duty to
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maximize their own happiness.94 Furthermore, marriage laws currently embody this
assumption in that no-fault, easy-dissolution divorce laws are rooted in the idea that
individuals should remain free to maximize individual utility.95 Even assuming these
strong values of individualism, individuals might rationally choose a more restrictive
marital regime. Proposals have been as restrictive as the “indissoluble marriage”
proposed by Christopher Wolfe, or as modest as short waiting periods from the time a
divorce is sought until the divorce may be granted.
Proponents of pre-commitment in marriage often draw an analogy to Ulysses and
the Sirens to illustrate how pre-commitment might be a rational strategy in marriage.96
Ulysses wanted to hear the beautiful voices of the Sirens, but having heard the stories of
seafarers and their ships being dashed against the rocks in pursuit of the voices, he knew
he would not be able to resist once he heard the sound. To protect himself and his crew,
he put wax in the ears of his crewmembers and had them bind him to the mast of the ship
and told them not release him (despite his pleas to be set free) until they were well out of
earshot of the Sirens. As Elizabeth Scott has argued, such pre-commitment strategies
“are useful in situations in which an individual has a long-term preference or goal that
she anticipates will conflict on some occasions with temporarily dominant short-term
preferences.”97 A person may use pre-commitments to “reinforce long-term goals,
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thereby mitigating the problem of inconsistent choices,” similar to the way Ulysses had
himself physically bound to avoid his short-term preference to chase after the Sirens.
Theodore Haas uses a game theoretic approach to imagine the utilitarian calculus
in marriage in terms of cooperative or selfish behavior.98 In his conception, each partner
chooses to act either cooperatively or selfishly, cooperation being defined as acting to
maximize group welfare and selfishness being defined as seeking to maximize one’s own
welfare without concern for one’s spouse.99 The decision matrix below100 represents a
rough sketch of the spouses’ choices and their resulting payoffs using a simple utilitarian
calculus:
Figure 1
Wife’s Behavior
Husband’s
Behavior

Selfish

Cooperative

Selfish

(3, 3)

(1, 4)

Cooperative

(4, 1)

(2, 2)

The matrix illustrates that if both spouses are cooperative (lower right cell), each
spouse has a higher payoff than if they both were to act selfishly (top left cell)—both
achieve their second-best outcome instead of their third- best outcome. It is important to
recognize that each spouse’s behavior provides the context for the other’s behavior.
Accordingly, neither one can achieve the first-best outcome in which one acts selfishly
while one’s spouse acts cooperatively. This is because when one acts selfishly, one’s
spouse has the incentive to switch to selfish behavior.
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Haas explains, however, that because loving couples are likely to “desire to
enhance the welfare of the other rather than simply . . . use the other as an instrument to
enhance their own welfare,” a different matrix of outcomes is likely to be more
realistic.101 In this more realistic (and more attractive) version, each person derives
utility not only from his or her own welfare, but also from the welfare of the other.102
The following decision matrix103 sketches choices and payoffs under this second rubric:

Figure 2
Wife’s Behavior
Selfish

Cooperative

Selfish

(2, 2)

(3 or 4, 3 or 4)

Cooperative

(3 or 4, 3 or 4)

(1, 1)

Husband’s
Behavior

This matrix imagines a world in which mutual cooperation is the best outcome and
mutual selfishness is a distant second-best outcome. Haas reasons that this conception of
self-interest would cause the spouses to prefer mutual selfishness to one spouse taking
advantage of the other.104
Haas argues that spouses or prospective spouses confront not one, but both of
these matrices.105 While an individual may view the second matrix as a “vision of the
happy life,” a rational individual will incorporate the first matrix into decisionmaking
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because he or she is aware that human nature is not entirely altruistic.106 Because current
divorce law does not protect the decision to cooperate (i.e. either spouse may decide to
unilaterally terminate the marriage without any legal consequences), the spouses may end
up in the top right or bottom left cells of the first matrix—yielding the worst possible
outcome for one of the spouses.107 Accordingly, spouses may rationally eliminate this
risk by entering into a legally enforceable agreement that protects the decision to
cooperate, either by restricting the grounds for divorce or by penalizing the divorcing
spouse.108
Elizabeth Scott argues that pre-commitment devices, such as opting for more
restrictions on the availability of divorce, could promote marital stability by:
(1) Directly adding to the cost of seeking a divorce;
(2) Indirectly promoting cooperative behavior and reducing conflict during
marriage by reducing the likelihood that divorce will be considered; and
(3) Fostering careful decisionmaking about marriage, which would discourage
impulsive marriages and encourage decisions consistent with an individual’s
long-term preferences.109
In Scott’s formulation, direct burdens on the decision to divorce are intended to
“operate only as safeguards against overvaluation of the alternatives or exaggeration of
the costs of marital dissatisfaction.”110 Consequently, short- term preferences are given
less immediate weight in the decision calculus since over time these preferences will be
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less significant in the long-term cost-benefit analysis.111 Scott recognizes that precommitment theory presumes that short-term preferences will change from time to time,
while long-term preferences remain relatively stable.112 While it is possible that longterm preferences will change, feedback effects make it even less likely that this will occur
once spouses enter a marriage with pre-commitment devices because, as in other longterm contractual relationships, “the threat of legal enforcement reduces the temptation to
defect and reinforces cooperative patterns of behavior.”113
Together, the game theoretic and pre-commitment models make a strong case for
the possibility that rational individuals desiring to maximize their self-interest might
decide to opt into a more restrictive marital regime. Furthermore, the communitarian
critique suggests that society would be better off if individuals were to enter into such
commitments.
B. Why Communities of Faith Should Encourage Pre-Commitments
Not only could individuals rationally choose a more restrictive form of marriage,
but also communities of faith could rationally encourage such choices. In fact,
communities of faith could play an important role in strengthening the institution of
marriage by requiring that the couples they marry adopt more restrictive marriage terms.
A particular community of faith might rationally require that such terms be adopted for
two major reasons. First, a community might see itself having a social responsibility to
play a part in cultivating more enduring marriages such that the communitarian vision of
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benefits to the broader society is more fully realized. Second, the community might
desire for its members’ civil marriages to more accurately reflect the community’s more
binding religious understanding of marriage.
While some, or even many, communities might decide not to require additional
marriage terms, others might prefer a more distinct role in marriage than they currently
play. They would no longer simply facilitate marriages. Instead, communities would
have the option of actually shaping ongoing marriage relationships. While this would
enhance the role they play, their role still would be limited by the extent to which couples
are willing to accede to demands by the community.
While communities would have some opportunity to shape the terms of
marriages, couples could always look to the marriage terms market to check this power.
If requirements imposed by a particular community of faith became too onerous, a couple
could seek out another religious body to perform their wedding. Even if communities of
faith worked together to set “mandatory” minimum additional marriage terms for any
religious marriage, couples could always turn to the civil authorities, which would
validate marriages without additional terms. Whether or not particular couples decide to
adopt or reject a community’s required terms, communities would play a potentially
important role because they would gain social power to approve or disapprove of
particular marriage terms. While this increased social power might raise some concerns,
communities of faith are likely to look favorably upon this proposal for this reason.
C. Overcoming Challenges to Allowing a More Restrictive Marriage Regime
Already, a number of objections have been voiced to a proposed regime in which
couples are allowed to opt for more restrictive marriage terms. These objections are
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likely to intensify in response to this call for communities of faith to be allowed and
encouraged to limit who they marry to those couples who agree to additional legally
enforceable marriage terms that reflect a particular community’s definition of marriage.
Broadly, these objections can be grouped as: (1) challenges to the philosophical approach
of the proposed regime; (2) concerns about the proposed regime’s predicted effects; (3)
constitutional problems related to the establishment and free exercise clauses; and (4)
public policy and contract law objections.
First, this paper addresses the philosophical challenges by arguing that the
proposed regime is more consistent with postmodern social values such pluralism and
individualism than the current marriage regime. Second, this paper makes clear that
concerns about the predicted negative effects of the proposed regime are either not likely
to occur or should not be considered problematic. Furthermore, even if some of the
predicted negative effects were to materialize, the benefits of the proposed regime would
outweigh the consequences. Third, this paper explains enforcement of contractual
restrictions and burdens on divorce, even when a community of faith is involved, does
not raise significant establishment clause concerns because such obligations neither
entangle the state in church affairs nor churches in state affairs. In addition, significant
free exercise problems are not implicated because such self-imposed obligations are not
necessarily religious in nature. Fourth, this paper argues that public policy objections
should not be sustained because the proposed regime actually would further the public
policy of promoting marital stability and the proposed regime would not per se violate
contract law. While additional marriage terms should not be rejected out of hand, this
paper does argue, however, that courts should use public policy and contract law to
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invalidate particular unenforceable terms, similar to the way courts approach commercial
contracts.
1. Philosophical Challenges
While each of the existing philosophical challenges to a marriage regime allowing
people to choose more restrictive marriage terms likely would grow stronger in intensity
in response to the role I have outlined for communities of faith, this paper is unlikely to
generate opposition that is different in kind from the concerns that already have been
raised. Possibly the most significant philosophical objection to the proposed marriage
regime comes from communitarians. Though communitarians share the ultimate goals
that underlie this proposal, including fostering interdependence and attachment as well as
empowering mediating institutions such as communities of faith, communitarians would
object to the means advocated in this proposal. Some have argued that proposals to
encourage private ordering, albeit with the ultimate goal of furthering more traditional
values, take the wrong approach by emphasizing the maximization of individual utility.114
This approach maintains that private ordering as a means “fail[s] to respect the strong and
legitimate interest that society as a whole has in the regulation of marriage.”115 Thus,
according to this approach, turning to private pre-commitment strategies constitutes
“giving up” on this shared public commitment to marriage.116 Communitarians maintain
that this public commitment should be preserved because of the significance of marriage
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for children and because marriage continues to be the “primary foundation of the family,
which is the foundational unit of our society’s structure.”117
The communitarian contention that private ordering constitutes “giving up” on a
shared public commitment to marriage is partly correct. This proposal takes account of
the fact that there now exists a widely shared public commitment to the postmodern
values of pluralism and individualism. Rather than cling to the notion that all of society
must live out communitarian values—which it, in fact, does not—this proposal is more
modest in simply allowing room for those who do wish to live out these values. At the
same time, however, this proposal would not surrender the shared public commitment to
marriage since this proposal would not eliminate the current role of the government in
setting the floor for marriage entry and the minimum obligations spouses must assume
toward one another. In addition, under the proposed regime the government also would
continue to promote the shared value and public policy of marital stability.
Other critics argue that a more restrictive marriage regime allowing the use of
pre-commitment mechanisms is paternalistic in that this approach only allows individuals
to limit (and not expand) their future options.118 If current marriage and divorce laws
significantly restricted individual freedom as to future options, this argument would be
more plausible. However, in light of pervasive no-fault divorce laws and the wideranging enforcement of prenuptial agreements that protect individuals’ assets upon
entering marriage, it is difficult to see how individuals’ future options might be
expanded. Under current law, marriage can only limit future options to a very small
degree. Accordingly, there is no room, let alone need, to allow individuals to expand
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future options, yet there is room, and an expressed need, for expanding individuals’
ability to limit future options.
Similarly, it has been said that a marriage regime that increasingly looks to
contract would take away a couple’s freedom not to contract, thereby coercing couples to
make a choice, which is seen by some as just as paternalistic as making the choice for the
couple.119 Some advocates for the extension of contract principles in marriage have gone
so far as to suggest “compelling marrying parties to determine the economic
consequences of their own divorce,”120 but this proposal does not go so far. Whereas
forcing parties to specify in this way what they expect out of marriage would constitute
forcing a choice, the proposal here should not be seen as impinging on couples’ ability
not to contract because it would allow couples to marry without any additional marriage
terms. Some would argue, though, that even the availability of the option to contract
constitutes taking away the freedom not to contract because the parties must in a sense
negotiate their agreement not to contract. This extreme view seems to be a strained
understanding of paternalism.
Finally, critics have argued that a marriage regime relying on pre-commitment
mechanisms does not adequately deal with the unpredictability of human development.121
Such critics see pre-commitment as inherently problematic in that earlier “selves” are
empowered to constrain the freedom of later “selves.”122 Furthermore, it is argued that
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earlier “selves” are unlikely to make rational choices in this context because any
restrictions they impose on themselves are “premised on the overly sunny assumptions
about future identities made by the optimistic selves about to be wedded.”123 Scott
addresses the concern that long-term preferences will change by reasoning that the precommitment devices themselves are likely to promote cooperative behavior, resulting in
“compatible rather than alienated later selves.”124 While changes in long-term
preferences may in fact be rare, she fails to address directly how pre-commitment theory
can deal with truly changed long-term preferences.
A more direct response to this criticism is the following:
(1)

This approach to marriage rests on the assumption that individuals
should be allowed to assess whether they are likely to gain or lose from
binding themselves. Furthermore, this approach assumes that
individuals do a better job of determining risks in their intimate
relationships than does the state;

(2)

Allowing individuals to self-impose restrictions will change the way
they think about marriage and, unlike the current marriage regime, will
encourage them to adopt marriage terms that account for the possibility
of changes in long-term preferences;

(3)

The fact that some individuals’ long-term preferences will not be
protected does not undermine the soundness of the proposed marriage
regime. Critics of proposals involving pre-commitments ignore the
fact that the current marriage regime does not protect those whose
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long-term preferences would be protected by enforcing precommitments. The proposed marriage regime would simply shift the
law from favoring those whose long-term interests are served by nonenforcement of pre-commitments to favoring those whose long-term
interests are served by enforcement. This shift makes sense given that
(a) more individuals may have long-term interests in enforcement of
pre-commitments than in non-enforcement125, and (b) society is likely
to derive positive externalities from more stable marriages.
2. Negative Effects
Beyond the philosophical concerns that have been voiced against proposals to
expand the use of contract in marriage, critics have voiced concern that extending
contract will have a negative disparate impact on women. In fact, however, this proposal
is likely increase women’s bargaining position at the outset of marriage. Some feminists
have attacked the use of premarital agreements generally because they tend to “protect
the wealth and earnings of an economically superior spouse from being shared with an
economically inferior spouse” and they “undermine the precarious socioeconomic status
of women and sharpen gender inequality in the distribution of wealth.”126 These
arguments may have some merit with regard to the types of prenuptial agreements that
are currently enforced. In contrast, allowing marrying parties to restrict the grounds
available for divorce or to penalize the party seeking divorce is likely to further the
interests of the economically weaker party, usually the woman.
125
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Allowing parties to opt into a more restrictive divorce regime increases the
bargaining position of the economically disadvantaged party by protecting marriagespecific investments. Under the current no-fault divorce regime, the party (usually the
woman) who invests in marriage-specific skills rather than market-valued skills is left in
a precarious position because the value of that person’s investment can be eliminated by
his or her spouse filing for unilateral no-fault divorce.127 Parties who opt into a more
restrictive marital regime are likely at the outset to consider this possibility and
accordingly will design terms that protect the economically weaker spouse. Though not
all couples will adopt such terms, a regime that allows these kinds of choices would be
better even for those economically weaker spouses who do not adopt such terms in their
marriages because they would have specific notice as to whether their investment in
marriage-specific skills will be protected and could plan accordingly.
This line of argument leads directly to the other major concern of feminists with
regard to contract in marriage: the reinvigoration of traditional gender roles.128 Feminists
have voiced concern that some proponents of expanding the use of contract in marriage
intend, among other things, to enable couples with a preference for a division of labor
along traditional gender lines to do so by protecting the spouse who does not develop
market-valued skills.129 Advocates for contractual autonomy have been called “new
paternalists” for seeking to purchase marriage stability “at a cost which is unacceptable,
unnecessary, and unknowable.”130 The feminist concern is that freedom of contract in
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marriage “seeks to burden both sexes with outdated role assumptions,” and this cost is
considered unnecessary because “our shift into a culture of divorce has ebbed” and the
lessons of harm to children and the illusion of freedom in going from marriage to
marriage have already been learned.131
First, it remains to be seen to what degree couples would choose a division of
labor according to traditional gender roles if they were given increased freedom of
contract in designing their marriage terms. Second, assuming some couples agreed to a
division of labor in which husbands were in the market labor force and wives focused on
domestic work, it is blatantly paternalistic to argue that because the proposed regime
would allow this choice to be made, the regime itself would be per se sexist and
discriminatory toward women. The feminist critique misses the mark by calling those in
favor of individual freedom and a system that enhances the bargaining position of
economically disadvantaged spouses the “new paternalists” who merely make “obeisance
to nonsexist linguistic norms.”132 Instead, such feminists should be seen as paternalistic
elites who seek to impose their values by coercing couples to “choose” androgynous roles
and for both spouses to work in the marketplace.
Feminists are not the only group to voice concerns about the ultimate impact of
treating marriage more like a contract, however. Some social conservatives have
speculated that a greater pluralism in marriage will actually further undermine the
institution of marriage by paving the way for the likes of lower-commitment marriage,
gay marriage and polygamy.133 A move toward contract in marriage might lead to
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unpredictable consequences, including even some of those consequences predicted by
this concerned subset of social conservatives. As the argument goes, allowing couples to
bind themselves to one another according to more enduring terms as they see fit, makes it
more difficult to fend off the argument that other couples should be able to bind
themselves to one another as they see fit, albeit according to less enduring terms.134
Similarly, others would argue that the logic favoring increased private ordering in
intimate relationships counsels in favor of even further private ordering, such as for
homosexuals and polygamists.
The state of commitment in marital commitments in America, however, has
reached such a low point that (1) things cannot get much worse for the institution of
marriage, and (2) even if these forms of marriage were to spring up as a result of the
proposed innovation,135 on balance, the institution of marriage would still be strengthened
through legally enforcing a more binding subset of marriages. Once given the option, a
significant proportion of people may choose more binding forms of marriage. While
there may be a small minority that would opt for a less exacting marriage relationship, it
is difficult to imagine many people would choose an explicitly “second class” kind of
relationship.136 Some would say this reinforces the notion that extending contract
principles in this area is inapt by showing people would not be free to pursue their “true”
preferences. Instead, it seems more likely that the “true” preference of most people is for
a lifelong committed relationship. Because most individuals begin marriage hoping for it
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to last and believing that it will last, extending contract principles is the only way to give
individuals the tools to actually accomplish their lofty goals.
3. Constitutionality Under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
The proposed marriage regime could implicate church/state constitutional
concerns. It might be argued that the proposal raises establishment clause concerns by
involving the state in essentially religious activities, that is, religious marriage
agreements. At the same time, it might be argued that the proposal raises free exercise
clause concerns because enforcement of some contractual provisions could amount to
forcing individuals to perform religious acts.
While the particular marriage terms focused on in this paper—restrictions and
burdens imposed on the availability of divorce—do not appear to seriously implicate such
church/state concerns, other possible marriage terms might raise more serious questions.
For example, enforcing arbitration clauses that defer authority to a religious body could
entail greater state entanglement with religious affairs. In addition, arbitration clauses
that call for resolution of claims based on religious doctrine could cause the state to
enforce performance of actions that are more religious in nature. Discussion of these
concerns already had been developed in the context of the Jewish ketubah, a marriage
contract of sorts that may call for the involvement of a Jewish tribunal, a Bet Din, acting
in accord with rabbinical tradition.137
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The establishment clause essentially requires that the state be neutral and
detached from religious activities.138 The Supreme Court set out its three-prong test for
violations of the establishment clause in Lemon v. Kurtzman: “First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’”139 The proposed marriage regime satisfies
each of these conditions. First, there are multiple secular purposes: the proposal furthers
individuals’ freedom of association and contract and also advances the long-established
public policy of promoting marital stability. Second, while the proposed regime would
empower communities of faith to exercise sway over marriage terms for couples who
seek a congregation’s blessing, the primary effect of the proposed regime would not be
furthering religion per se. Instead, the primary effect would be neutral with respect to
religion, simply granting greater autonomy to individuals. As such, the proposal would
neither further nor inhibit religion. Third, with respect to restrictions and burdens placed
on the availability of divorce, there is not likely to be any entanglement between
government and religion. The regime would not sign over a blank check of power to
religious bodies. The proposed regime only allows religious bodies to serve as
gatekeepers as to the kinds of marriages they bless. While religious doctrine might
inform the kinds of restrictions or burdens on divorce that a couple might adopt, there
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would be no entanglement because such terms are not likely to be expressly religious in
nature.140
The free exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution “affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any.”141 Violations of the free exercise clause must be based on a sincere religious belief
and must be the result of government action.142 Government action constitutes a
violation of free exercise rights where it imposes a significant burden upon a person’s
free exercise of religion and this imposition is not overcome by a compelling state
interest.143 Burdens on the free exercise of religion have been categorized as: (1) forcing
one to do something forbidden by one’s religion, (2) preventing one from doing what is
required by one’s religion, (3) making religious observance more difficult or expensive,
or (4) forcing someone to do something “religious,” which the person does not wish to
do, though such an objection may not be based on religious beliefs.144
Restrictions and burdens on the availability of divorce are likely to be challenged
under the free exercise clause where an individual either changes his religion or decides
to no longer observe a religion. While it is possible that an individual might only agree to
particular marriage terms based on affiliation (or non-affiliation) with a particular
religion, enforcement of a restriction or burden on divorce does not necessarily force an
act that is religious in nature. Courts reviewing Jewish religious divorce cases have
adopted this view, determining that requiring a divorcing spouse to undergo a “get”
140
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procedure – which frees the religious spouse to remarry under the dictates of Orthodox
Judaism – before a Jewish tribunal does not impinge on the non-religious spouse’s free
exercise rights.145 Even if a court were to find a significant burden imposed on an
individual’s free exercise rights, the court could find several compelling secular state
interests that would justify the imposition, including freedom of contract, the promotion
of marital stability, or the advancement of children’s well-being. In the case of the “get”
procedure, one court held that requiring the non-religious spouse to undergo the
procedure furthered public policy by promoting “amicable settlement of disputes”
between spouses and “mitigate[ing] potential harm to the spouses and their children”
resulting from the divorce process.146
4. Public Policy and Contract Law
Historically, premarital agreements were held per se invalid because they were
considered contrary to the public policy of promoting marital stability.147 It was assumed
that such agreements facilitated divorce by allowing the marrying parties to contemplate
and prepare for divorce. The Florida Supreme Court led the charge toward change by
enforcing a premarital agreement involving alimony payments.148 The court held that
premarital agreements were not void ab initio against public policy and instead they
could simply constitute the reordering of property rights and realistic planning accounting
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for the possibility of divorce.149 Over time, courts held that agreements were invalid only
if they went further such that they induced separation or divorce in a marriage that
otherwise might continue.150 It would be difficult to argue that the proposed marriage
regime violates this historic public policy concern since making available the option to
restrict the grounds for divorce or to impose additional burdens on the party seeking
divorce would actually further, not undermine, the underlying public policy of promoting
marital stability.
As the use of premarital agreements has grown, however, so has the list of public
policy-related concerns. Probably the most extreme objection comes from those who
compare agreements to place restrictions on divorce to agreements to self-enslavement.151
This argument rests on the idea that though “every executory contract limits the freedom
of the parties by creating an enforceable obligation, on both sides, to perform or pay
damages,” a contract of self-enslavement is characterized by the elimination of the option
of paying damages.152 Consequently, even voluntarily chosen restrictions or burdens on
the availability of divorce are seen in this view as a “special threat” to the promisor’s
“integrity or self-respect” because they take away the “right to depersonalize his
relationship with the other party by substituting damages for the performance he
originally promised.”153
Such self-imposed restrictions on the availability of divorce can be distinguished
from self-enslavement on several grounds. First, most restrictions and burdens on
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divorce that would be adopted under the proposed marriage regime would be simply
restrictions and burdens, not absolute prohibitions on divorce. Accordingly, adoption of
such marriage terms is not likely to implicate the supposed threat to personal autonomy.
Instead, restrictions and burdens on the decision to divorce would only increase the cost
of seeking a divorce, which should be seen as reflecting the reliance of one’s spouse on
the marriage contract. This suggests that only marriage terms that provide for an
absolutely indissoluble marriage should be considered violative of the public policy
concern raised. Second, enforcement of restrictions or burdens on divorce, even those as
extreme as an indissoluble marriage, would not necessarily be inconsistent with decrees
of legal separation.154 This reduces the concern of self-enslavement to a concern that a
party would not be able to remarry and would be required to maintain some minimal
legal bond with a spouse. Third, while specific performance is not generally granted with
respect to contracts, including as to the continuation of partnership agreements, there are
situations in which it is appropriate.155 It may make sense, however, for courts to enforce
specific performance of marriage contracts that provide for restrictions or burdens on the
availability of divorce because damages are unlikely to compensate adequately, and
specific performance could increase investment in marriage by reducing alternative
investments.156 In addition, because the importance of marriage or family to society is
much greater than any commercial relationship, it makes sense to allow self-imposed
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restrictions or burdens on divorce even when we do not allow the same in a business
context.157
It also has been suggested that the extension of contract in marriage might create
incentives for negative behavior in marriage, which could implicate public policy
concerns.158 For example, where a couple has agreed to impose some sort of penalty159
on a party who files for divorce, there might be an incentive to avoid the penalty by
acting in such a way as to induce the other party to file for divorce. This scenario is
unlikely, however, because marrying parties who opt into additional marriage terms are
likely to foresee this possibility and adopt terms that provide incentives for reinforcing
positive marital behavior and disincentives for negative marital behavior. Of course, this
may raise concerns similar to those voiced prior to the availability of no-fault divorce that
courts are ill-suited for inquiring into such intimate details.160
Some commentators have raised concerns that premarital agreements that place
burdens on obtaining a divorce should be considered against public policy because they
may result in an unfair distribution of wealth.161 Accordingly, there have been calls for
review of premarital agreements based on the requirement of “substantial fairness.”
Despite these concerns, the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (“UPAA”), which has
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been adopted in a slight majority of the states, has shifted away from “substantive
fairness” review at the time of enforcement.162
Despite this trend, the American Legal Institute (“ALI”) Principles, which do not
merely restate the law but also propose new approaches in the law, call for
nonenforcement of premarital agreements where enforcement of particular terms would
work a “substantial injustice.”163 Even under the ALI Principles, before a court can find
“substantial injustice” would result, certain circumstances must be met: either a certain
number of years must have passed since the agreement was executed, a child must have
been born or adopted by parties who had no common children at the time of the
agreement, or there must have been a “change in circumstances that has a substantial
impact on the parties or their children” that was probably not anticipated at the time of
execution.164 If one of these circumstances is met, the court may consider various factors
to determine whether substantial injustice would result.165 While the exact standard
employed depends on the law enacted in each particular state, the trend is toward
enforcement regardless of the standard adopted.166
Some argue that even the ALI proposal does not go far enough in upholding
fairness. For example, one author has argued the notion of substantial fairness should be
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extended to include “a presumption of unenforceability for antenuptial agreements that
deviate materially from a fifty-fifty division of marital property.”167 As previously
discussed, however, it may be rational for marrying parties to agree to provisions that, if
enforced, would result in an inequitable division of property. Such terms could protect
and encourage investment in the marriage by increasing the cost of either spouse seeking
alternatives. By enforcing these kinds of agreements, courts would actually further the
ultimate goals of “substantial fairness” review because marriages with such agreements
would be less likely to end in divorce, thereby avoiding the division of property and
earning potential altogether. It is also important to note that the proposed regime does
nothing to change the limits already imposed on the distribution of property upon
divorce. Accordingly, particular marriage terms might be unenforceable (or modifiable)
in whole or in part if they violate particular statutory provisions. For example, provisions
that cause one party to be eligible for public assistance would continue to be
unenforceable.168
The shift away from “substantive fairness” review at the time of enforcement has
been toward an evaluation of more traditional contract law doctrines, such as
voluntariness and unconscionability, which focus on the time of execution.169 The UPAA
focuses on these concerns as well as certain disclosure requirements, all of which can be
compared to the law of partnership agreements.170 None of these requirements
necessarily conflict with the proposed marriage regime. Terms agreeing to restrictions or
burdens on the availability of divorce should not be considered per se involuntary or
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unconscionable, but particular agreements or terms that meet the traditional contract law
requirements for involuntariness or unconscionability would be deemed unenforceable
under the proposed regime. The fact that some terms might be involuntary or
unconscionable, however, in no way undermines the entire proposal.
These concerns are already regulated in part by the UPAA and its state variants.
For example, the UPAA states that premarital agreements must be executed voluntarily to
be enforceable.171 By providing for the nonenforcement of agreements that are
involuntary even if they do not rise to the level of fraud or duress, the UPAA supports a
liberal interpretation of the voluntariness requirement similar to a procedural
unconscionability inquiry.172 Therefore, particular agreements or terms would be subject
to challenge under the proposed regime. Given that restrictions or burdens on the
availability of divorce may be rational choices that maximize an individual’s utility,
though, there would be no reason to suspect out of hand that such agreements or terms
were entered into involuntarily.
In addition, the UPAA provides that a premarital agreement is unenforceable if it
was unconscionable at the time of execution.173 Unconscionability under the UPAA,
however, requires that the challenging party “did not receive ‘fair and reasonable
disclosure’ of the assets and liabilities of the other party, did not waive his or her right to
such disclosure, and did not have adequate actual knowledge of such information.”174
The notes to the UPAA state that the standard intended for unconscionability is the same
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as that in the commercial context.175 Under this standard a contract or term will be
considered unconscionable where there is an “absence of meaningful choice on the part
of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party.”176 The UPAA and state variants have enacted provisions to allow for broad
enforcement in favor of contractual freedom instead of favoring more paternalistic
protections for economically weaker spouses.177 Accordingly, the standard for
unconscionability adopted by the UPAA is weaker than it might have been. The
proposed marriage regime is entirely consistent with these developments.
As legislation has granted deference to premarital agreements, so have courts
moved toward enforcement of premarital agreements through an emphasis on individual
autonomy. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1990 upheld a premarital
agreement with great deference stating, “Prenuptial agreements are contracts, and, as
such, should be evaluated under the same criteria as are applicable to other types of
contracts. Absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the
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terms of their agreements.”178 The court went on to note “the reasonableness of a
prenuptial bargain is not a proper subject for judicial review” and determinations of
reasonableness at execution or divorce “are exactly the sorts of judicial determinations
that such agreements are designed to avoid.”179 The proposed marriage regime might be
seen as an outgrowth of this trend.
This emphasis on individual autonomy naturally raises the question as to whether
individuals would actually be exercising autonomy in a regime that allows and even
encourages communities of faith to play a significant role in the development of marriage
contracts. Presumably, under the proposed regime communities of faith might either (1)
operate individually, deciding on their own whether to require that a form agreement be
adopted by couples or to work with couples to develop couple-specific terms, or (2) work
together, developing standard “religious” marriage terms that anyone in a community
would be required to adopt should they wish to obtain a “religious” marriage. Under
scenario (1), there should be little concern that individuals would be deprived of
autonomous decisionmaking since there would exist a market likely to offer a range of
possible marriage terms. Should the marriage market develop more along the lines of
scenario (2), however, a potential concern arises akin to that of adhesion contracts.
First, even if communities of faith were involved in the proposed marriage regime
as under scenario (2) and offered marriage terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the
resulting premarital agreements would not necessarily constitute contracts of adhesion.
As one court defined them, “‘Adhesion contracts’ include all ‘form contracts’ submitted
by one party on the basis of this or nothing [and] agreements in which one party's
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participation consists in his mere ‘adherence,’ unwilling and often unknowing, to a
document drafted unilaterally and insisted upon by what is usually a powerful
enterprise.”180 Under the proposed regime, contracts resulting under scenario (2) would
not meet the definition of adhesion contracts because the party unilaterally requiring
adherence to the terms (the community of faith performing the marriage) would not be a
party to the contract.
Furthermore, contracts of adhesion are not per se unenforceable, but rather
determining that a contract of adhesion exists is only the first step in the analysis of
whether such agreements are enforceable.

To be considered unenforceable, contracts of

adhesion must include “overreaching by a contracting party in a superior bargaining
position.”181 Sometimes courts also require that there be an absence of meaningful
alternatives182 or that the contract contain oppressive terms, thereby folding a requirement
similar to unconscionability into adhesion contract analysis.183 Again, because
communities of faith would not be a contracting party under the proposed regime,
marriage contracts under the proposed regime would not constitute adhesion contracts.
Nonetheless, there may be concern because communities of faith could work together to
exert pressure on couples to adopt additional marriage terms. This seems to be a weak
argument, however, because couples would continue to have the option of obtaining a
civil marriage from civil authorities and they could marry with either no additional terms
or whichever additional lawful terms the couple preferred.
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IV.

Conclusion
In view of the decline of the institution of marriage and the fact that a large

percentage of American society continues to desire more stable marriages and children to
be raised by their married parents, some have naively sought to impose a more traditional
normative vision of marriage and the family through the law. Most notable among these
efforts has been the call to reinstate a fault-based marriage regime. Such efforts fail to
account for the enormous cultural shift that has taken place over the last half-century.
While Americans may desire more enduring marriages, in the wake of the sexual
revolution, they also in large part have adopted postmodern values, which demand
adherence to the values of equality, individual freedom, and tolerance. As a result, a
legal strategy for strengthening marriage will only be effective and capable of being
implemented if it can appeal to postmodern values rather than making one-size-fits-all
moralistic prescriptions for society.
This proposal for a marriage regime with an expanded role for contract appeals to
the truly postmodern values of individualism and tolerance, while enabling individuals
who value more traditional or communitarian principles to adopt marriage terms that
reflect those values. Furthermore, such choices need not be seen by the broader society
as merely sacrificial choices made for the good of the community. In fact, the decision to
restrict or burden the availability of divorce can be consistent with the widely accepted
notion that individuals should seek to maximize their own utility. Regardless of whether
such choices are self-sacrificing or utility-maximizing, the postmodern value of tolerance
calls for respect for those individuals who would make such choices. Furthermore,
pluralism dictates that involvement by communities of faith should be respected
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alongside marriages officiated by civil authorities. While the non-legal efforts of some
communities of faith, particularly through Community Marriage Policies, have been
laudable and effective to some extent, only a regime involving legal enforcement can
truly empower communities of faith and their individual members to make binding longterm choices for their marriages.
While the role advocated here for communities of faith is likely to be
controversial, their active positive role in the proposed marriage regime stands up under
legal and policy challenges. Specifically, premarital agreements to restrict or burden the
availability of divorce should be enforced as wet out in this proposal. At the same time,
the government should maintain its role in defining marriage by setting the floor for the
requirements to enter marriage, as well as the minimum responsibilities of spouses to one
another. The historical public policy of promoting marital stability should serve as a
guide both in setting these minimum requirements, as well as in determining which
additional marriage terms will be enforced. In addition, contract and constitutional law
should continue to set the outer limits for terms agreed to by couples. Such restrictions
and burdens, however, should not be deemed unenforceable per se under contract or
constitutional law. This proposed marriage regime would carry out now widely accepted
postmodern values by allowing pluralism in marriage to flourish, but would also
empower individuals to strengthen their marriage bonds by choosing to emphasize more
traditional or communitarian values such as interdependence and attachment.

59

